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TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT -THE KEY TO SUCCESS OF ARMY TRANSFORMATION
The events of September 11, 2001 have forever changed the skyline of New York City and very likely the view that the United States has of the international community. The days of traveling freely from country to country and even from state to state in this previously unthreatened country will never be like it once was, worryfree. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the subsequent downing of a third airliner in the rural country-side of Pennsylvania, have
given the American people a lesson on foreign policy development and international relations. The American impression that "it can never happen here" is a thing of the past. If anything good can come out of this horrible tragedy, it is that these events have brought to light the fact that events around the world indeed impact the lives of Americans. If Americans were not aware of U.S. foreign policy formulation, their country's stance on international issues, or how the instruments of the U.S. national power can be used to shape world opinion, then the events of September 11, 2001 are an expensive but albeit necessary lesson.
In order to address this country's uncertain future and to provide the American people, as well as our nation's allies and friends, with assurances that the U.S.
Army is prepared to address threats of this nature in the future, the Secretary of the • Army is C-3 for facilities with some C-4
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In many instances these decisions were made in favor of protecting required training events, often times under the extreme pressure of meeting specified readiness levels within reduced budgets. The Army has existing tools with which to focus these efforts, and to its credit continues to develop greater, more flexible tools which will assist senior Army leadership in their decision making process.
The Installation Status Report (ISR) and the Strategic Readiness System (SRS) will be discussed to shed light on how these two systems will assist in allowing installations to accomplish their designated missions. Both the ISR and SRS are tools designed to report the status of the conditions of installations and family programs. The SRS was designed to provide installation commanders with the flexibility to project anticipated requirements and is anticipated to be sufficiently adaptable to meet the Army's transformational goals. While the ISR and SRS identify requirements, it is resources applied to those requirements that will improve our installations.
The second major area of concern for the Army is the day-to-day management conducted a survey of over 13, 000 active duty and reserve officers across 61 installations. One of the findings is that:
"many officers reported that they don't mind working long hours, training all night, deploying and making sacrifices, as long as the Army lives up to its part of the bargain --such as well-being for families and a fair shake at advancement." Additionally, "The Army's commitment to well-being, family and personal time, health care, housing, and retirement benefit expectations are not being fully met." 1
What is interesting to note is that the results of this report are strikingly similar In this chapter, the Secretary specifically addressed the connection between QOL and retention.
There is a direct relationship among readiness, retention, and quality of life. To the extent that the Department encourages or directly provides quality housing for both unaccompanied and married service personnel, it will materially improve job performance and satisfaction, improve the retention of quality individuals, and through these means, sustain the high levels of force readiness needed to meet the Department's national security missions. The Army has an expression, "You enlist the individual, but you reenlist the family."
Many of the issues raised during this report were brought to light as a result of entitled Army Well-Being, will be examined in some detail. This area is perhaps the most crucial area in that it focuses on the centerpiece of the Army itself-people.
We will examine the programs underway to meet the needs of Army families-an ever-growing and seemingly limitless demand for better services. Again, the Army has taken some steps to address this area by making improvements essential for ensuring soldiers continue serving their country and recruiting future generations of this Army's leaders.
Fortunately, both the installation infrastructure issue and many of the WellBeing issues come under the purview of a single directorate on the Army Staff. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management (ACSIM) has staff responsibility for both of these programs as well as a myriad of other functions. A closer look at the organizational structure of the ACSIM and in particular the newly formed Installation Management Agency (IMA) will focus this discussion on how the Army intends to address both these areas to meet its obligation to comply with the National Military Strategy's goals and objectives set forth by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the National Security Strategy (NSS) which it supports. In order to understand how the Army fits into the scheme of meeting these national objectives, a closer look at the national directives is necessary.
WHY IS TRANSFORMATION OF INSTALLATION MANAGEMENT (TIM) IMPORTANT?
A close examination of the recently published Bush Administration's NSS and the previous Clinton strategy both identify national interests that impact on how the United States will develop options to protect itself from future asymmetric terrorist threats. Army Transformation and subsequently TIM, derive their essence from our national interests.
The National Security Strategy for a Global Age published in December 2000
provides the basis for the goals the Clinton administration had determined to be national interests, "Our national interests are wide-ranging. They cover those requirements essential to the survival and well-being of our Nation as well as the desire to see us, and others, abide by principles such as the rule of law, upon which our republic is founded."
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The Clinton NSS continues by categorizing these national interests into three groups: vital, important and humanitarian. Among the vital interests specified in the strategy are:
the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the safety of our citizens both at home and abroad, protection against WMD proliferation, the economic well-being of our society, and protection of our critical infrastructures….. . We will do what we must to defend these interests. This may involve the use of military force, including unilateral action, where deemed necessary or appropriate.
freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity." 4 The "ways" of achieving these "ends" include, "transform[ing] America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century."
5
To this end, the Bush NSS specifically advocates preemptive acts to forestall hostile acts by U.S. adversaries. To support these preemptive options, the NSS directs that the U.S. "will continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results."
6
If we were to identify our national interests as those outlined above, then perhaps defeating terrorist organizations globally can be considered an "end" which advances these national interests. The "ways" by which we are to attain these ends We must prepare for an uncertain future, even as we address today's security problems. We need to look at our national security apparatus to ensure its effectiveness by adapting its institutions to meet these challenges. This means we must transform our capabilities and organizations-diplomatic, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and economic-to act swiftly and to anticipate new opportunities and threats in today's continually evolving, highly complex international security environment.
7
What is important to note, however, is that the administration specifically addressed three areas in which the military's transformation had to strike a balance in funding priorities. "Maintaining the ability of our forces to shape and respond today; modernizing to protect for the long term readiness of the force; and exploiting the revolution in military affairs to ensure we maintain unparalleled capabilities to shape and respond effectively in the future." This is a sweeping change from the role that the military has had previously in regard to assisting in domestic issues. Previous domestic assistance involved, in large part, the mobilization of reserve component forces for natural disasters. The potential now exists for direct intervention on domestic soil across state lines, which would involve federally mobilizing military forces. Infrastructure decline will negatively affect domestic readiness response. This is particularly concerning given the likelihood that military forces will be used for mitigation of consequences following a terrorist use of WMD. Consequence management is specifically included in the NSS.
We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use WMD against the United States and our allies and friends….The United States must be prepared to respond to the effects of WMD use against our forces abroad, and to help friends and allies if they are attacked.
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This implied task means that the U.S. military must be capable of deploying forces both internal to the Continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) in the event of a WMD attack. To this end, the Bush NSS specifically advocates preemptive acts to forestall hostile acts by U.S. adversaries.
To support these preemptive options, the NSS directs that the U.S. "will continue to transform our military forces to ensure our ability to conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results." To review, the NSS, the NMS and the QDR specifically have identified the requirement for the capability of our forces to be able to quickly react to asymmetric threats in the future. This capability to rapidly deploy forces both abroad and at home is crucial in securing our national interests. Inherent in providing this capability to power project forces assumes that installations are adequately manned, trained and equipped to do so.
WHAT DOES THE ARMY NEED TO DO ABOUT IT?
The Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) has made some significant strides in addressing the known shortfalls that would hamper projecting forces at home and abroad. It has also taken some important steps forward in addressing the needs of soldiers and their families. But are these steps truly transformational? In two respects I believe they are transformational. Under the direction of the SECDEF, the Army has streamlined and flattened organizationally.
In business theory, this reorganization would result in fewer hurdles managers would have to negotiate to reach their desired end-states. Additionally, guidance and feedback flowing from both managers and action officers would be more clearly articulated and understood. Secondly, I believe that the recent emphasis on strategic planning at the installation level is key to success and is to date unprecedented. Strategic planning has for the most part been the responsibility of higher-level organizations in the Army which have had the time and staffing to accomplish the detailed planning needed. By requiring installations to plan for the out-years, the Army will ensure that subordinate units' strategic goals and objectives are properly aligned with their higher headquarters' goals and objectives. This will ensure that the organization as a whole is progressing in the direction desired by the senior leadership. The culmination of installation strategic planning will come to fruition when this planning can be tied to senior leader resource allocation decisions. Strategic planning at the installation level is simply a drill unless resources are allocated in sufficient amounts to achieve desired goals and objectives. Although the Army cannot operate as many large corporations can in the private sector, largely because of external influences such as Congressional oversight, it can incorporate many of the private sector managerial tools necessary for success.
THE TRANSFORMED ORGANIZATION AND ITS PROGRAMS.
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Installation Management is organized as shown in figure 2 below. Vision: The pre-eminent Department of Defense agency that produces highly effective, state-of-the-art installations worldwide, maximizing support to People, Readiness, and Transformation. Goals: 1) Manage installations equitably, effectively and efficiently ; 2) Enable the well-being of the Army's people; 3) Provide sound stewardship of resources; 4) Deliver superior mission support to all organizations; and 5) Develop and sustain an innovative, team-spirited, highly capable, service-oriented workforce-a vital component of the Army Team. 13 An understanding of the underpinning for the establishment of the IMA is necessary before we go further. For as long as most professional soldiers can remember, the bulk of HQDA Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA) funding was devoted to ensuring that our war-fighting machinery was prepared to do battle and win our nation's wars. That often entailed ensuring that vehicles were operationally ready, that sufficient ammunition was available to qualify on specific fighting platforms and that training facilities were made available for maneuver units whenever they were needed. One can not argue with the rationale used. The consequence of our enthusiastic support of this approach was that all other necessary functions fell victim to accomplishing this "mission". Since monetary resources were allocated to MACOM Commanders, it was their command prerogative to place those resources where they felt it was best used. The result was that both infrastructure and mission dollars came from the same pot of money. "We continue to under-fund the necessary maintenance and repair of our aging real property inventory by as much as 70 percent. Our installations are very much on the verge of catastrophic failure because we have failed to fund their continued sustainment through a viable Army-wide installation maintenance system." 15
The Army has attempted to address this significant issue by formulating a centralized management system to create a firewall between mission funds and installation funds. As discussed previously, the continued migration of BASOPS dollars into mission accounts has resulted in both DoD and Congressional involvement. This involvement stemmed largely from Congressional testimony by
General Hugh Shelton and the service Chiefs of Staff on 27 October, 1999. Their testimony included the following statements:
America's first-to-fight forces remain capable of executing national military strategy, including the ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, Shelton said. But because of readiness concerns, military officials assess the risk factors for fighting and winning the first major war as moderate, and for the second as high. This does not mean that U.S. forces would not prevail in either contingency," he said. "What it does mean is that it will take longer to respond to hostilities, which in turn means territory lost and an increased potential for casualties." A total of 95 services are aligned with these functions. Customers who require services above and beyond those stipulated within the ABS, will incur additional charges for those services. This endeavor to establish baseline standards will significantly enhance installations commanders' ability to properly budget for needed services as well as conduct long-term planning.
FIGURE 4 ARMY BASELINE SERVICES
In FY 04, when funding comes directly from IMA Headquarters, the installation commanders' loyalty to the local mission commanders' requirements may be in conflict with the regional headquarters' interests. The installation commanders' primary mission is to support the senior mission commander in successfully accomplishing his war-fighting mission. The installation commander also has the responsibility to provide the same level of support to other tenant unit organizations on the installation. Under budgetary constraints, the installation commander will be called upon to decide where these limited resources are applied. Given current guidance, installation commanders will be rated by their respective Regional Directors and senior rated the senior mission commander. This situation exacerbates itself given the proximity of the local mission commander compared to the more distant Regional Director, both vying for efficient use of scarce resources.
The decision to apply resources judiciously to provide acceptable services for all tenant organizations may at times be in conflict with the senior mission commanders' desires to support his training requirements. This will require installation commanders to carefully balance commitments to their senior raters with the requirements from other organizations.
WHAT IS THE MEASURE OF SUCCESS?
If the sweeping organizational change of installation management is accomplished, and the funding lines are clearly defined, then what is the measure of success in determining that the Army is addressing the critical infrastructure problems? The Installation Status Report (ISR) was designed after the maneuver units' Unit Status Report (USR) with the exception that the ISR is submitted
annually. This annual analysis may in fact be the cause of its ineffectiveness, which will be described as part of recommendations for improvement. The ISR was developed by HQDA in 1994 as a way to assess installation level conditions and performance against Army-wide standards. Data is compiled annually from all Army installations. This data is then used to develop a three-part report. The ISR uses familiar "C" ratings used to convey the "quality or quantity" of given facilities or services based on previously established standards.
In an effort to reduce workload on limited installation staffs and to take advantage of information technology, the Army has developed the ISR so that it would essentially rely on information readily available in various databases currently in existence. The ISR integrates many currently available institutional databases which reduces redundant reporting requirement for installations. These data bases ability to allocate resources to achieve to the highest degree of readiness. This predictive capability is a critical part of the installation commanders' assessment of successfully supporting war-fighting units' deployments from their installations. Of particular importance would be the ability to anticipate future power-projection requirements for installations. This is extremely valuable given the need for installations to be more involved in long-tern strategic planning as mentioned earlier.
The SRS will be a tool that allows the Army's senior leadership to manage and assess the readiness of the transformed force by using existing readiness data and linking them to the overall strategy of TAP. SRS is currently being fielded. The SRS is the only tool that installation commanders will have available to "project" future requirements based on current funding and resource constraints.
The SRS enables commanders to develop long-term strategies which, in turn, formulate clearly identified requirements. Solutions to these requirements can be formulated which ultimately identify the resources needed to meet the goals and objectives of the overall strategy.
HOW CAN IT BETTER BE USED?
First, both the ISR and the SRS are extremely dependent upon maintaining numerous databases that are tedious and manpower intensive. The training of personnel who are responsible for inputting data into these systems has been marginal at best. Many times command emphasis on accurate data collection is crucial to success. To be truly transformational these systems need to be network based with as little manpower involvement as possible. Additionally, the frequency at which the senior Army leadership reviews these reports must be increased. The pace at which the security environment changes is so frequent that the information provided may very well be obsolete when finally reviewed. In its current state, the CSA or his designated representative, reviews ISR data annually. This annual review is not sufficient to make substantive adjustments to Army programs to benefit the organization. The ISR system must be made more interactive as to provide senior leaders the ability to adjust programs in near real-time as to make appropriate adjustments in a timely manner. Semi-annual reviews of this data with appropriate resource allocation decisions would allow sufficient flexibility to address emerging issues.
Secondly, in addition to these technology based reporting systems; the Army must conduct a thorough review of its quality management program. As I previously mentioned, the Army cannot always function and operate as large corporations do in the civilian sector. However, true measurement of success in any organization can be determined by how well it meets the expectations of its customers, both internal and external to the organization. In the case of the Army, its internal customers are If we're to win the war on terror and prepare for tomorrow, we have to take proper care of the department's greatest assets, which are the men and women in uniform. They joined because they love their country and they believe freedom's worth defending. But at the same time we have to realize that they have families to support and children to educate.
THE HUMAN DIMENSION
The second area critical to the success of transformation is its people. Unlike many other organizations which may rely heavily on automation or machinery, the Army cannot function without its most important asset-people. Key to the retention and recruitment of this most valuable asset are the Army's Quality of Life programs.
In this age of limited resources and ever-demanding needs of its people, the Army must make great strides in addressing the day-to-day needs of its key assets. On Transformation and soldier, civilian and family Well-Being.
FIGURE 5 ARMY WELL-BEING CAMPAIGN
The Army is undergoing a significant transformation, a transformation that will affect its most fundamental nature. The philosophical framework laid out in this document depicts the "Institutional Strength of The Army" as Army Well-Being resting on a solid foundation -a foundation which is the very "fundamental" nature of our institution. The current Army transformation initiative will alter that foundation; the Army Well-Being initiative will alter the remaining components of the Institutional Strength of The Army.
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This may very well be the lynch-pin to ensuring that Army Transformation is truly successful. If Well-Being is a personal state and it differs from person to person (soldier, civilian and family member), then the Army must focus on this fundamental entity. In other words, the Army must find the least common denominator in these three entities and attempt to meet the minimal expectations of this population in order to be successful. The Army must also be extremely careful in managing the expectations of this population without alienating those which it must rely on to accomplish its missions.
The Army Well-Being Strategic Plan identifies the state of well-being as having four basic dimensions of life experience. If the Army was to adequately address the minimal standards of these four basic dimensions, then in turn, the well-being needs of the Army will be met, at least minimally. These dimensions are depicted in the figure 6 below. Senior Army leadership must ensure that the SRS, ISR and WBSR programs obtain the resources necessary to ensure that they become fully automated and integrated. Additionally, the frequency with which the senior Army leadership reviews these reports must be increased. In an era of rapid change and high tempo of operations, an annual review of this data is not sufficient to make substantive adjustments to Army programs. A semi-annual review of this data with appropriate resource allocation decisions would allow sufficient flexibility to address emerging trends and issues.
In order to accomplish any of the actions mentioned above, communications to internal and external customers is essential. The Army must ensure that the programs already established (AFAP, FRGs, APIC) continue to receive funding at appropriate levels to remain viable. In particular the Army must ensure that concerns raised at the installations receive the level of attention necessary to keep community members involved in long-term strategic planning. Installation commanders must ensure that appropriate feedback is being provided to their internal customers regarding the status of their issues. Community involvement on grass root issues will result in continued retention and recruitment successes. These recommendations do not require considerable expenditure of resources. Rather they suggest reemphasis on synchronizing existing or newly formulated programs that would enhance the CSA's efforts in meeting the Army's strategic objectives. TIM and the formation of the IMA are methods to ensure that resources get to the installation level rather than being diverted by MACOMs to augment mission requirements. The SRS, ISR and the WBSR are valuable tools which will allow installation commanders to report current and projected installation readiness as compared to established standards. These systems, once fully integrated, will provide the senior leadership of the Army with near-real time information on which resourcing decisions can be made.
CONCLUSIONS
In doing so, a closer relationship between leaders and community members must be established in order to properly address the greatest concerns of the Army family. Internal and external customer communications is key to fostering this relationship both in terms of consideration of the needs of the community as well as in terms of expectation management. Current Army programs such as AFAP, FRGs and ACS channels are sufficiently mature to allow the Army leadership to enhance this communication.
"The Army is People", it's the theme we are all familiar with. The impetus that the CSA has imparted to ensure irreversible change is to be complemented. To ensure that his vision for this nation's Army is realized, it is incumbent upon the senior leaders to implement the programs necessary to fully realize the magnitude of these efforts. Transforming the Army is inextricably linked to the infrastructure of its installations and the Well-Being of its people. The vast efforts undertaken to reorganize installation management and to harness the myriad of quality of life programs into a comprehensive decision-making mechanism are impressive.
Continued fiscal support, continued scrutiny at the most senior levels of leadership, and continued willingness to take risk in the face of rapid change will be the hallmark of ensuring that the Army continues on the successful path of transformation.
Without this crucial support and scrutiny from the most senior levels of the Army, installation management and its inherent programs will revert to their previous unsatisfactory state and will in turn put Army Transformation at risk.
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